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UPSTREAM, MIDSTREAM,
AND DOWNSTREAM:
DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN FOR
SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT
JANET MARTINEZ, ESTHER CONRAD,

AND

TARA MORAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
With expansion of global populations and increasing demand for water
supplies, global communities, agriculture, and other industries increasingly
depend upon groundwater as a safe and secure water source.1 In many regions of the globe, as well as in the United States, overreliance on the resource has resulted in serious environmental and social impacts. Home to
the U.S.’s largest agricultural industry, California typifies many of these
challenges. Groundwater supplies thirty-eight percent of the state’s water
supply during average climatic conditions and up to sixty percent of the
state’s water supply in drought years.2 Recent and severe droughts in California have resulted in all-time historic low groundwater levels in most
groundwater basins throughout the state and have led to the drying of domestic wells, the loss of groundwater-dependent ecosystems, and lowering
of the land surface at a rate of more than two feet per year in certain parts of
* Janet K. Martinez, J.D., M.P.A., Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer in Law and Director, Gould
Negotiation & Mediation Program, Stanford Law School; Esther Conrad, Ph.D., is a postdoctoral
Fellow at Water in the West and Stanford Law School; Tara Moran, Ph.D., is Groundwater Program Lead, Water in the West, Stanford University. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding
made possible by a seed grant from the Stanford Woods Institute’s Environmental Venture
Projects program and the S.D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation.
1. B.L. MORRIS, A.R.L. LAWRENCE, P.J.C. CHILTON, B. ADAMS, R.C. CALOW & B.A.
KLINCK, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, GROUNDWATER AND ITS SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DEGRADATION: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT
(2003).
2. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA’S GROUNDWATER – UPDATE 2013: A COMPILATION OF ENHANCED CONTENT FOR CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2013
1 (2015), http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/topics/groundwater/index.cfm [hereinafter CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2013].
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the state.3 In many cases, overreliance on groundwater has led to disputes
between interest groups about who has priority rights, and how to manage
this scarce common pool resource.4
Dispute system design offers a way to consider these disputes at multiple, inter-related levels. Tracking the stream metaphor described by Lisa
Amsler in this volume,5 upstream refers to the legislative process to set
policy; midstream covers the efforts of local agencies to implement that
policy; and downstream involves resolution of competing rights over ownership and use. This paper will focus on California’s newly-enacted legislation to manage groundwater and Stanford University’s “Water in the West”
research project6 to study the legislation’s effect. The implementation of
California’s new groundwater law illustrates some unique features as a dispute system and provides a more nuanced understanding of the challenges
involved in implementing such systems. We hope that our learning will
benefit not only California groundwater managers, but beyond, as an example of collaborative governance as one form of dispute system design.
II. BACKGROUND
California lacked statewide regulation of groundwater pumping or
standards for groundwater management until 2014.7 Unconstrained use of
this resource in many parts of the state has led to widespread lowering of
water tables, land subsidence, and impacts to in-stream flows, groundwaterdependent ecosystems, and surface water rights holders.8 In 2014, during a
historic drought, California enacted the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), which:
• Provides for sustainable management of groundwater basins;
• Enhances local management of groundwater consistent with rights
to use or store groundwater;
• Establishes minimum standards for effective, continuous management of groundwater;
3. TOM G. FARR, CATHLEEN JONES & ZHEN LIU, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
PROGRESS REPORT: SUBSIDENCE IN THE CENTRAL VALLEY, CALIFORNIA 5 (2015), http://water.ca
.gov/groundwater/docs/NASA_REPORT.pdf.
4. CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2013, at 6.
5. Lisa Blomgren Amsler, The Negotiator’s Role Within a Dispute System Design, U. ST.
THOMAS L.J., p. ___ (2016).
6. Water in the West integrates research in law and policy, geophysics, engineering, and
economics to identify and develop solutions to inform more effective groundwater management
and policy. Sustainable Groundwater, WATER IN THE WEST, http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/
programs/sustainable-groundwater (last visited Nov. 28, 2016).
7. CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA’S GROUNDWATER BULLETIN 118 – UPDATE 2003 32 (2003), http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/groundwater/bulletin_118/california’s_
groundwater__bulletin_118__update_2003_/bulletin118_entire.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN 118 UPDATE 2003].
8. CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2013, at 9.
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• Provides local groundwater agencies with the authority and technical and financial assistance needed to maintain groundwater
supplies;
• Avoids or minimizes impacts for land subsidence;
• Improves data collection and understanding of groundwater resources and management;
• Increases groundwater storage and removes impediments to
recharge; and
• Empowers local agencies to manage groundwater basins, while
minimizing state intervention.9
With 515 alluvial groundwater basins in California, SGMA requires
groundwater management in 127 groundwater basins designated as medium
or high priority.10 SGMA requires local agencies to form new governing
entities, known as Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs) by June
30, 2017.11 GSAs can be comprised of one or more local public agencies
and will ultimately be responsible for developing and implementing the
groundwater sustainability plans (GSPs) capable of meeting a basin’s sustainability goals within twenty years of plan implementation.12 Governor
Brown noted:
A central feature of these bills is the recognition that groundwater
management in California is best accomplished locally. Local
agencies will now have the power to assess the conditions of their
local groundwater basins and take the necessary steps to bring
those basins in a state of chronic long-term overdraft into
balance.13
Through a system design lens, California’s groundwater management
mandate triggers challenges at all three levels: “upstream” as state-level
legislative and regulatory processes established SGMA; “midstream” with
the formation of GSAs and development of GSPs; and “downstream” as the
enforcement of water rights allocations. We begin our discussion with an
9. The three bills that comprise SGMA and its related statutes are Assem. B. 1739, 2013–14
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014), 2014 Cal. Stat. Ch. 347; S.B. 1168, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2014), 2014 Cal. Stat. Ch. 346; and S.B. 1319, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014), 2014 Cal.
Stat. Ch. 348.
10. The California Department of Water Resources prioritized the state’s 515 groundwater
basins into one of four categories: high, medium, low, and very low. Factors considered in prioritization include population, number of wells, degree of reliance on groundwater as a primary
water source, impacts such as overdraft and land subsidence, and others. The 127 medium and
high-priority basins account for 96% of groundwater pumping in the state. See Groundwater Basin Prioritization, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/cas
gem/basin_prioritization.cfm (last modified Nov. 30, 2015).
11. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10724, 10735.2(a)(1) (West 2015).
12. CAL. WATER CODE § 10725 et seq. (West 2015).
13. Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of California, to the Members of the California Legislature (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/Groundwater_Signing_Message
.pdf.
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analytic framework for system design generally, followed by an overview
of the key elements relative to groundwater policy and a research strategy
to study the specific process design experience in Yolo County.
Located in California’s Central Valley, Yolo County covers portions
of four groundwater basins, which are a critical source of supply for both
agricultural and urban water uses.14 Historically, groundwater conditions
have remained fairly stable in most areas of the county, but in recent years,
unirrigated pastureland has been converted to irrigated tree crops such as
almonds. This shift in land use is placing increasing demands upon groundwater resources, particularly during the severe drought that has gripped California since 2011.15 In addition to illustrating the competition over access
to groundwater resources, Yolo County also provides a good setting in
which to study the “midstream” aspects of dispute system design. Local
government entities, as well as non-governmental organizations (e.g., environmental advocacy groups), have a relatively long history of collaboration
through the Water Resources Association of Yolo County (WRA), which
was first formed in 1993.16 As described later in this paper, the WRA has
been leading an effort to engage stakeholders to form a new GSA at the
scale of the county. These pre-existing collaborative efforts suggest that
Yolo County may be well-positioned to develop robust collaborative governance arrangements for SGMA implementation.17
III. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

FOR

DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN

Dispute system design (DSD) encompasses one or more processes that
have been put in place to anticipate, manage, resolve, and learn from a
stream of disputes connected to an organization or institution. The framework we apply contains six elements: goals; stakeholders; context and culture; structures and processes; resources; and accountability.18
14. BULLETIN 118 - UPDATE 2003, at 156. Portions of the Colusa, Yolo, Solano, and Capay
Valley groundwater subbasins fall within Yolo County. BULLETIN 118 - UPDATE 2003, at 156–57.
In October 2016, at the request of local agencies, portions of these subbasins were consolidated
into a single Yolo subbasin to facilitate coordinated management. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF WATER RESOURCES, DRAFT BASIN BOUNDARY MODIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS: MEMORANDUM TO THE CALIFORNIA WATER COMMISSION (2016), http://water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/pdfs/
BBMod_ExecSummary_CWC_2016.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2016).
15. Dan Morain, Drought Transforms Valley, Right in our Own Backyards, SACRAMENTO
BEE (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/danmorain/article41974
266.html.
16. See WATER RES. ASS’N OF YOLO CTY., http://www.yolowra.org (last visited Nov. 28,
2016).
17. Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 543, 543–71 (2008).
18. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System Design,
14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009). This article introduced the original version of the DSD
Analytic Framework. As our thinking progressed, we added Culture and Context and reordered
the categories.
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A. Goals
In designing (or re-designing) a system, the decision-maker19 will ideally deliberate on what goals she seeks to achieve and what types of conflicts the system seeks to address. Possible objectives are myriad—for
example, conflict prevention, efficiency, working relationships, public
safety, public recognition, justice in outcomes or procedures, reputation, organizational improvement, or sustainable resource management. Each objective is likely desirable, but establishing priorities will enable a more
focused system design as well as a metric for evaluating the system’s
effectiveness.
In the case of groundwater, the formal goal established by SGMA was
to achieve sustainable groundwater management in the state’s basins, where
sustainable groundwater management is “the management and use of
groundwater in a manner that can be maintained during the planning and
implementation horizon without causing undesirable results.”20 Such management should avoid “significant and unreasonable” levels of six “undesirable results”: chronic lowering of groundwater levels resulting in depletion
of supply, reduction in groundwater storage, seawater intrusion, degraded
water quality, impacts resulting from land subsidence, and surface water
depletion impacting surface water supplies.21 As a system, the goals aim to
both preserve a natural resource and ensure fair management of water
rights.
B. Stakeholders
The second framework element is the identification of stakeholders
and analysis of their relationships and relative power. Stakeholders include
the people and organizations that create, host, use, and are affected by a
DSD.22 In addition to the immediate parties in conflict, stakeholders can
include individuals or entities subsidiary to or constituents of those parties,
as well as others directly or indirectly affected by the outcome of the dispute. As a policy issue, groundwater management qualifies as a “wicked
environmental problem”—a problem that is complex in terms of the degree
of conflict, the number of stakeholders, the level of confidence over information on the issue, the number of alternative strategies, and the knowledge
19. By “decision-maker,” we mean one or more individuals or entities with the authority to
commission and implement the design.
20. CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(x) (West 2015). For an excellent historical overview of
water policy in California that led to SGMA, see Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times Call for
Sensible Measures: The Making of the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 5–40 (2016). See also CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES, GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA BULLETIN 118-80 iii (1980), http://www
.water.ca.gov/pubs/groundwater/bulletin_118/ground_water_basins_in_california_bulletin_11880_/b118_80_ground_water_ocr.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN 118-80].
21. CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(x) (West 2015).
22. Smith & Martinez, supra note 18, at 162.
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and certainty of consequences.23 Direct parties and affected stakeholders
include overlying property owners, municipalities, public water systems,
state agencies, local land use agencies, monitoring entities, water lawyers,
mediators, groundwater policy experts, agricultural users, social and environmental advocates, surface water users (if surface and groundwater bodies are connected), the federal government, California Native American
tribes, and disadvantaged communities.24
Under SGMA, local decision-makers have wide latitude in the formation of GSAs in high and medium priority basins. Local agencies may decide to form a single GSA at the scale of a groundwater basin, or multiple
GSAs as long as they coordinate with one another in planning at the basin
scale.25 SGMA also requires that the GSA consider interests of all beneficial users, and specifically that in the process of developing its GSP, the
GSA “shall encourage the active involvement of diverse social, cultural,
and economic elements within the groundwater basin.”26 In this respect,
SGMA takes seriously the need for extensive and meaningful stakeholder
engagement, as emphasized in collaborative governance theory and dispute
system design. Additionally, because the legislation allows for the possibility to adjudicate basins, individuals or groups that do not feel adequately
represented in the process may choose to file (or threaten to file) a legal
action against a GSA. While this legal challenge may help to ensure comprehensive and meaningful engagement in groundwater management planning, it may also provide large economic interests with additional
negotiating power, as the interests of these individuals have traditionally
been favored in adjudications.27
C. Context and Culture
Context and culture comprise the third element. By context, we mean
the circumstance or situation in which a system is diagnosed and designed.
Jennifer Lynch writes about the contextual catalysts (“5 C’s”) that often
trigger organizational system design: (i) compliance with legislation or policy; (ii) cost of grievance, litigation, and settlement; (iii) crisis in the media;
(iv) competition for scarce resources; and (v) cultural transformation.28 In
23. P.J. BALINT, R.E. STEWART, A. DESAI & L.C. WALTERS, WICKED ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS: MANAGING UNCERTAINTY AND CONFLICT (Island Press 2011).
24. CAL. WATER CODE § 10723.2 (West 2015).
25. Esther Conrad et al, TO CONSOLIDATE OR COORDINATE? STATUS OF THE FORMATION OF
GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY AGENCIES IN CALIFORNIA (2016), http://waterinthewest.stanford
.edu/publications/.
26. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10723.2, 10727.8 (West 2015).
27. M. Rhead Enion, Allocating Under Water: Reforming California’s Groundwater Adjudications, 4 PRITZKER ENVTL. L. & POL’Y BRIEFS 1, 12–13 (2013).
28. Jennifer Lynch, Beyond ADR: A Systems Approach to Conflict Management, 17 NEGOT.
L.J. 207, 211 (2001). For an excellent historical overview of California water policy and enactment of SGMA see Leahy, supra note 20.
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the context of groundwater, a number of potential triggers have emerged,
including mandated compliance with SGMA, the financial, economic, and
social costs of pursuing groundwater rights adjudication, California’s water
drought crisis, and the ability to maintain local control over the resource
and improve long-term resilience.
Culture is commonly viewed as arising within national, regional, or
religious contexts but can also develop across a profession, a community, a
corporation, or other organization. Disputants—individuals, firms, or countries—respond to conflict in a number of ways. Individuals have different
conflict management styles; moreover, institutions and organizations may
develop particular conflict management approaches. Countries and social
groups are influenced by their own cultural understandings and approaches
to conflict. Water rights in the West, and in California, have driven land use
politics, economics, and ecology for decades—recall the movie Chinatown
with Jack Nicholson in 1974 on California’s water wars and Cadillac Desert by Marc Reiser on California’s water policy.29 State and local actors
have come to reconsider the barriers posed by California’s highly decentralized approach to water management and to begin to emphasize more collaborative approaches to water management coordinated at the basin-scale.
While Katz v. Walkinshaw30 established the concept of correlative
groundwater rights in California giving each landowner “a fair and just proportion” of a groundwater basin’s safe yield, this legal requirement is not
the common perception and is not commonly upheld in local groundwater
management. 31 Overlying land owners often incorrectly perceive their
rights to be unlimited access to groundwater. As a result, overlying land
owners view any limits placed on pumping as a “taking” and may use any
attempt to limit extractions as a trigger for legal action.
SGMA emerged in part through a recognition that long-standing norms
in which access to groundwater is an unassailable private property right
have begun to be questioned. However, it is important to note that SGMA
does not have the authority to determine or alter surface water rights or
groundwater rights. As a result, implementation of the legislation at the
local level remains vulnerable to adjudication. California adopted legislation in 2015 to harmonize future adjudications with groundwater planning
under SGMA.32 SGMA retains the “culture” of local control by empower29. MARC REISER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER
(Penguin Books 1993 rev. ed. 1986).
30. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 772 (Cal. 1903).
31. Rebecca L. Nelson, Assessing Local Planning to Control Groundwater Depletion: California as a Mircocosm of Global Issues, 48 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1, 1–14 (2012).
32. S.B. 226, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (adding a chapter to SGMA in the Water
Code with rules on adjudications that develop management plans under SGMA). Assemb. B.
1390, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (amending the Code of Civil Procedure and codifying
the rules for basin-wide groundwater adjudications).
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ing local agencies to design their own approaches to sustainable groundwater management, subject to some state requirements.
D. Structures and Processes
The fourth element pertains to the processes used to prevent, manage,
and resolve disputes; how those processes are related to each other and the
formal legal system; and what the incentives and disincentives for their use
are. Process options range across a broad spectrum, ranging from direct
negotiation, to third-party facilitation, mediation or arbitration, and also to
court adjudication. Here, we consider pre-SGMA and post-SGMA process
options. Before enactment of SGMA, groundwater allocation rights could
be managed in four ways.33 First, court adjudications have been used to
determine how much water can be extracted by groundwater users within
specific basins. Thirty basins have been adjudicated, which can be a costly
and time-consuming process.34 Second, laws can be passed by the Legislature to create a special act district with specific powers to manage groundwater. Third, ordinances can be enacted by a county or other local agency,
using its police powers to govern groundwater management.35 Finally, in
1992, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 3030 with a common framework for voluntary consensual management by local agencies overlying
groundwater basins.36 More than 200 agencies adopted Assembly Bill (AB)
3030 groundwater management plans prior to SGMA. However, this approach has been subsumed by the SGMA requirements for development of
basin Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs).
Post-SGMA, adjudication remains a means of enforcing groundwater
rights, but the process has been streamlined.37 Research is underway by the
authors, as well as other scholars, on what can be learned from past groundwater management arrangements to guide the formation of GSAs and their
respective GSPs.
E. Resources
Resources are a critical element to consider in terms of what financial,
human, data, and technological resources are needed and available to sup33. BULLETIN 118 - UPDATE 2003, at 32.
34. For a detailed historical review of California groundwater adjudications, see WILLIAM
BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS (ICS Press 1992). See generally RUTH LANGRIDGE ET AL., AN
EVALUATION OF CALIFORNIA’S ADJUDICATED GROUNDWATER BASINS (2016).
35. CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA’S GROUNDWATER BULLETIN 118, 124
(1975), http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/groundwater/bulletin_118/california’s_ground_water__bul
letin_118-75_/b118-1975.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN 118-75].
36. CAL. WATER CODE § 10750 et seq. (West 2015).
37. S.B. 226, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) and Assemb. B. 1390, 2015–16 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) were enacted as the Groundwater Adjudication Reform in October 2015
with revisions of the CAL. WATER CODE § 10737 et seq. (West 2015) and CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 837 et seq. (West 2015).
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port a system. In addition to providing the GSAs with the authority to levy
fees for groundwater management, SGMA requires the California Department of Water Resources (“DWR”) to provide technical and financial assistance to basins.38 Ideally, the state will provide consistent, accessible
funding for GSA formation as well as GSP development and implementation, with funds tied to specific and measureable goals and timelines. DWR
has already begun providing financial assistance to basins, including funding experienced professional facilitators to guide the GSA formation negotiations in some basins. However, past experience suggests that agencies will
need to develop plans to be financially self-sufficient over the long-term.
A distinct and critical resource is that of information. For the first time
in California’s history, the state has mandated data monitoring and management protocols to support sustainable groundwater management. These data
requirements include specific measures on recharge areas, groundwater
levels, groundwater quality, subsidence, and groundwater-surface water interaction.39 In basins with more than one GSA and GSP, coordination between these entities will be required to ensure that agencies are developing
GSPs using “the same data and methodologies.”40 A preliminary survey of
water users and managers in California revealed that the amount of groundwater data collected by local agencies varies widely, and local agencies are
often missing or lacking confidence in key data necessary for effective
groundwater management.41 A critical component of successful SGMA implementation will be the identification of data necessary to support groundwater management decisions and the development of funding to support
ongoing data collection, management, and analysis. In many cases, this will
require agencies to overcome cultural barriers associated with data collection and sharing between individuals and agencies, as well as for the funding necessary to support it. For example, the vast majority of groundwater
wells in California are not metered. As a result, most local agencies do not
know how much groundwater is being pumped out of the basin. Any attempts to meter groundwater wells are commonly viewed as an infringement on personal rights.

38. CAL. WATER CODE § 10729 et seq. (West 2015).
39. CAL. WATER CODE § 10727.2 (West 2015). The authors, under the auspices of Water in
the West and the Gould Center for Conflict Resolution, hosted a series of workshops on groundwater data and groundwater-surface water interactions, groundwater model, advanced technologies and geophysical methods, and decision-support tools.
40. CAL. WATER CODE § 10727.6 (West 2015).
41. See Draft Summary Report: Groundwater Data in the SGMA Context: Identifying
Groundwater Data Needs, Challenges, and Potential Solutions, Water in the West, Stanford University (Jan. 28–29, 2016), http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/related_docu
ments/GW_DataBackgrounder_v4.pdf.
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F. Accountability
Lastly, a system’s accountability and success will depend on the degree of transparency around its operation and whether the system includes
monitoring, learning, and evaluation components. The measures of success
will derive from formation of the GSAs, development of GSPs, and ultimately, achievement of sustainable groundwater management over time.
IV. PROCESS DESIGN
As described briefly above, the process architecture for policy formation, management, and enforcement can include one or more process options. In the context of groundwater management in California, the
legislative process to develop SGMA and the legislative mandates that it
contains constitute the upstream phase.42 Our research focuses on GSA formation and GSP implementation (mid-stream) and the enforcement (downstream) phases.
A. Midstream: Formation of GSAs
Prior to the passage of SGMA, groundwater management in California
was a patchwork of local arrangements managed by approximately 2,300
independent local agencies.43 Despite having overlapping jurisdictions or
adjacent boundaries, many water management agencies have not coordinated groundwater data or management efforts, resulting in management
fragmentation, inefficiency, difficulty in evaluating watershed-scale impacts, competition for limited state funding and technical assistance, and
inconsistency in planning.44 Implementation of SGMA provides water managers and the state with a unique opportunity to achieve sustainable groundwater management and ensure long-term protection of this critical resource.
In many cases, SGMA will require actions that have been necessary for
many years, or in some cases decades, but have not been politically feasible
without a state mandate. SGMA implementation will need to incorporate
the uncertainty of changing land use practices, water supply, population
growth, climate change, and other factors over its fifty-year planning and
implementation horizon.
Successful SGMA implementation will require a detailed understanding of existing groundwater conditions in each basin, the development of
42. For a detailed discussion of the creation of SGMA within the context of previous attempts to manage groundwater in California over the last century, see Leahy, supra note 20.
43. Nelson, supra note 31, at 1–14 (assessing local planning to control groundwater depletion with California as a microcosm of global issues).
44. Blomquist, supra note 34; Andrea K. Gerlak & Tanya Heikkila, Building a Theory of
Learning in Collaboratives: Evidence from the Everglades Restoration Program, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 619, 619–44 (2011); Nelson, supra note 31, at 1–14.
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measurable objectives to address undesirable results, and the ability to evaluate progress toward those objectives.
Local agencies and other participants in the newly formed GSAs will
need to assess the conditions that would constitute “significant and unreasonable” impacts of six “undesirable results” of groundwater pumping that
exist within their basins and establish measurable objectives and interim
milestones to avoid exceeding critical thresholds.45 Existing data about
groundwater conditions is often incomplete and uncertain, making it difficult to assess potential outcomes of management decisions and often creating grounds for disputes. SGMA’s long-term success will depend in large
part upon the creation of inclusive and durable local governance arrangements for groundwater management.
The process of forming a GSA is a complex one, in which local agencies and other stakeholders must choose or form an entity to serve as a
GSA.46 Any local public agency with water management responsibilities
has the right to form a GSA, but if a GSA does not span an entire groundwater basin, it must coordinate with other GSAs in the basin to either: (1)
develop a single GSP covering the entire basin; or (2) sign a coordination
agreement specifying how multiple GSPs in the basin will be based on the
same data and methodologies.47 In some cases, agencies have proposed to
modify basin boundaries in order to facilitate coordination.48 In addition to
determining its boundaries, each GSA must create its own governance
structure, and in doing so must consider the interests of key stakeholders.
SGMA includes a list of interested parties that must be consulted, including
landowners (who have overlying rights to groundwater), cities, counties,
disadvantaged communities, tribal governments, and environmental organizations and other entities concerned with environmental uses of
groundwater.49
SGMA will require local agencies, stakeholders, and water users to
make many difficult and potentially contentious decisions about issues such
as regulating pumping, levying pumping fees, and finding and purchasing
alternative sources of water to supplement supplies or recharge aquifers, in
45. CAL. WATER CODE § 10727.2(b)(1) (West 2015).
46. MICHAEL KIPARSKY ET AL., DESIGNING EFFECTIVE GROUNDWATER SUSTAINABILITY
AGENCIES: CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE OPTIONS, UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY
WHEELER WATER INSTITUTE (2016).
47. CAL. WATER CODE § 10727(b) (West 2015).
48. The California Department of Water Resources’ Basin Boundary Modification process
allows local agencies to request modifications based on either scientific or jurisdictional reasons,
or a combination thereof. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, DRAFT BASIN
BOUNDARY MODIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS: MEMORANDUM TO THE CALIFORNIA WATER COMMISSION (2016), http://water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/pdfs/BBMod_ExecSummary_CWC_2016
.pdf.
49. CAL. WATER CODE § 10723 (West 2015).
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order to meet legislated sustainability goals.50 These decisions are likely to
be fraught with problems and vulnerable to conflict and litigation if groundwater-pumping reductions are viewed as a “taking” of personal property
rights. Given this, it is crucial that robust governance arrangements be developed, and GSPs focus on data acquisition and collaborative processes to
build trust in both the data and models. The GSP development process must
be designed to achieve groundwater allocation decisions that are negotiated,
supported by water users as well as other stakeholders, sustainable, and
equitable for all parties involved.51
Previous work investigating natural resource decision-making has
shown that more effective solutions emerge when participants—including
water owners, managers, experts, and affected stakeholders—jointly grapple with and develop a shared understanding of data and problems.52 In
practice, this is a very complex process and is unfolding in diverse ways in
groundwater basins across the state. Yolo County provides a good example
of the challenges that arise even when stakeholders already have experience
collaborating with one another. The Water Resources Association of Yolo
County (WRA), formed in 1993, involves many of the key interested parties
with respect to groundwater, including cities, irrigation districts, and other
special districts providing agricultural water, as well as environmental organizations. Given their long history of working together, some leaders within
the WRA felt that the GSA should be formed at the scale of the county.
However, since the WRA is a non-profit association and is not itself a public agency, it could not declare itself to be a GSA. The WRA also did not
directly represent the interests of landowners. The WRA partnered with the
Yolo County Farm Bureau, a non-profit entity representing farmers’ interests, to form a Steering Committee to guide the process of creating a
county-wide GSA. With in-kind support of the Department of Water Resources, this committee obtained the assistance of a neutral facilitator to
help them engage additional stakeholders and the general public. Three
public meetings were held in March 2016, in which over 200 people, particularly landowners from across the county, participated. The committee has
also held individual and group meetings with many of the cities, irrigation
districts, and other public agencies, who are also eligible to become a GSA,

50. The law requires specifying groundwater sustainability agencies by 2017, completion of
groundwater sustainability plans by either 2020 or 2022, and achievement of sustainable management within twenty years of GSP implementation. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10724, 10720.7,
10727.2(b) (West 2015).
51. TARA MORAN & AMANDA CRAVENS, CALIFORNIA’S SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2014: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTING AND RESOLVING GROUNDWATER
CONFLICTS 2 (2015).
52. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, SARAH MCKEARNAN, & JENNIFER THOMAS-LAMAR, THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (1999).
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to discuss the value of and respective roles in working together at the
county scale.53
A key concern of landowners and of local agencies relying upon
groundwater is that the creation of a countywide GSA will mean that they
will lose control over how much groundwater they can extract, and that fees
may be imposed to cover costs of managing the entire groundwater basin,
even if groundwater conditions in their own part of the basin are fairly
good. To accommodate these concerns, the Steering Committee seeking a
county-wide GSA has proposed a model in which smaller “management
areas” would be established within the basin. Fees and groundwater extraction limits would be determined at this scale, while monitoring activities
and reporting to DWR would be undertaken by the GSA as a whole. It
remains to be seen if landowners and irrigation districts will accept this
compromise and what governance structure will be developed to implement
it. In the meantime, several special districts responsible for delivering irrigation water—several of whom are members of the WRA—have already
declared themselves to be separate GSAs, in case they are not satisfied with
how the county-wide process accounts for their interests.54
An important development is the notion of collective learning, which
refers to the process of developing a shared understanding of a problem and
ways of evaluating solutions.55 By jointly designing or using models or
other decision-support tools, scientists, decision-makers, and stakeholders
can develop a common understanding of a problem, starting assumptions,
and a means to evaluate possible solutions.56 Collaborative modeling systems have been shown to aid surface water management planning by allowing participants to test various scenarios without conceding their
positions.57 Our midstream research aim is to work closely with one basin
over the GSA formation process, observing public meetings and interviewing a broad range of participants (followed by structured interviews) to
53. The Yolo County Farm Bureau and Water Resources Association co-hosted SGMA
Groundwater Public Meetings on March 29, 30, and 31, 2016 in Woodland, Winters, and Clarksburg, California.
54. This description of the GSA formation process is based upon meeting observations and
interviews conducted by the authors.
55. Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi & Stephen Balogh, An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 17 (2011); Judith E. Innes & David E.
Booher, Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems: A Framework for Evaluating Collaborative Planning, 65 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 412, 412–23 (1999); Gerlak & Heikkila, supra
note 44; Tanya Heikkila & Andrea K. Gerlak, Building a Conceptual Approach to Collective
Learning: Lessons for Public Policy Scholars, 43 POL’Y STUD. J. 485, 485–512 (2013). See also
on social learning, Mark S. Reed et al., What Is Social Learning, 15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (2010).
56. S. BALRAM & S. DRAGIĆEVIĆ, COLLABORATIVE GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS
(2006); D.J. Wright, S.L. Duncan & D. Lach, Social Power and GIS Technology: A Review and
Assessment of Approaches for Natural Resource Management, 99 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 254, 254–72 (2009).
57. CONVERGING WATERS: INTEGRATING COLLABORATIVE MODELING WITH PARTICIPATORY
PROCESSES TO MAKE WATER RESOURCES DECISIONS 32 (Lisa Bourget, ed., IWR Press 2011).
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track changes in authority, distribution of responsibilities, participation in
the GSA process, data and technical information developed to support the
process, incidences of conflict, and resources (organizational, financial, and
technical) needed to support the GSA formation process and sustain it over
time. In addition, we will pilot two means of increasing collective learning
by participants in groundwater planning.
First, we will assess the value of remote sensing methods for data collection. Our research partners in geophysics58 are introducing the use of
remote-sensing satellite data (Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar, or
“InSAR”) to assess ground subsidence and provide this information to the
Yolo Basin’s policymakers. We expect that these techniques can provide
more accurate information at a lower cost to stakeholders when compared
to traditional approaches such as ground-based surveys. The study also includes a comparison of subsidence patterns to spatial and temporal patterns
of groundwater pumping, which may provide additional insights regarding
the causes and possible remedies for subsidence. We anticipate that this
information will affect stakeholder views regarding whether subsidence is a
significant problem in the county and what policy responses may be
needed.
We anticipate that in addition to the availability of this new technical
information, other factors will also shape stakeholder views. Previous research indicates that the use of scientific knowledge is shaped by whether
or not stakeholders view this new information as credible, salient, and legitimate.59 Furthermore, practitioners in mediation and conflict resolution
have found that knowledge developed through a joint fact-finding approach,
in which stakeholders participate in study design and implementation, is
more likely to be viewed as trustworthy and relevant to decision-making.60
We can expect that stakeholder perceptions of the impacts of subsidence,
their values with respect to those impacts, and their ability to trust satellitebased data and analysis results will affect what they learn from the InSAR
study.
Second, our water modeling partners61 will experiment with a collaborative modeling approach (adapted from surface water) to develop a shared
58. The George L. Harrington Professor in the School of Earth Sciences Rosemary Knight
and Jesse Crews, P.E., Stanford University.
59. David W. Cash et al., Knowledge Systems for Sustainable Development, 100 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8086, 8086–91 (2003).
60. Scott T. McCreary, John K. Gamman & Bennett Brooks, Refining and Testing Joint
Fact-Finding for Environmental Dispute Resolution: Ten Years of Success, 18 MEDIATION Q. 329,
329–48 (2001).
61. David Purkey, SEI Institute, Davis, California, has developed a collaborative model tailored for watershed scale management decisions. The Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP)
model has been used around the world to help managers, scientists, water users, and other stakeholders understand the status of a surface water basin, develop alternative management strategies,
and choose between them.
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understanding of the consequences of select groundwater management decisions. Collaborative modeling is a form of decision support that integrates
technical computer models with process and facilitation skills to guide
stakeholders through complex management decisions involving scientific
data. During the collaborative modeling process, representative stakeholders, decision-makers, and scientific experts work jointly to develop and test
a model that is representative of the system they are trying to manage. The
model is often run live in sessions, allowing real-time interaction and testing of alternatives, which keeps the discussions “reality-based.” The anticipated outcome of this research is a context-specific understanding of the
mechanisms influencing collective learning in California groundwater
planning.
Researchers at UC Berkeley’s Wheeler Water Institute authored a paper on designing groundwater sustainability agencies.62 Using nine criteria
for fairness and efficacy, they provide concrete illustrations aimed at facilitating groundwater managers’ GSA development. Further, the Department
of Water Resources will develop and publish non-binding best management
practices for groundwater management by January 1, 2017.63 Both of these
efforts are highly compatible and reinforce our research.
B. Downstream: Enforcement
Once GSAs are established, they will proceed to develop GSPs for
their respective basins. These GSPs are intended to define goals for the
sustainable management of each basin, and actions needed to achieve them.
GSAs will hold the authority to establish and revise groundwater allocations, set pumping fees, and institute enforcement penalties.64 If all goes as
intended under SGMA, the implementation of GSPs by GSAs will be the
primary manner in which allocations of groundwater rights are enforced.
However, two other avenues of enforcement also exist under SGMA.
First, if a GSP does not meet regulations set forth by the Department of
Water Resources or is not completed or implemented within legislated
timeframes, SGMA allows for the State Water Resources Control Board—
the state’s regulatory agency for water resources—to intervene in managing
a particular groundwater basin.65 Given the long-standing norms of local
control over water resources in California, the threat of state intervention is
a significant motivator for compliance. So far, no deadlines have passed
that could trigger state intervention, so it remains to be seen how this
method of enforcement will work in practice.
62.
63.
64.
65.

KIPARSKY ET AL., supra, note 46.
CAL. WATER CODE § 10729(d) (West 2015).
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10725, 10730, 10732 (West 2015).
CAL. WATER CODE § 10735 et seq. (West 2015).
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The second alternative to enforcement is the adjudication of water
rights in the courts. Since SGMA leaves groundwater property rights unchanged,66 parties who are unsatisfied with how their rights are being considered by a GSA during GSP implementation may seek adjudication.
Following SGMA’s passage, California streamlined its adjudication
processes; it remains to be seen how these new procedures will work in
practice.67 However, experience with adjudications prior to SGMA provide
some indication of how this process works. Upon filing a complaint in a
superior court, the court will define and determine water rights for all partyusers and provide for court supervised basin management by a watermaster.
Extensive research has been conducted on adjudications, most notably William Blomquist’s work with Elinor Ostrom at Indiana University on adjudications conducted up to 1990 in California68 and Ruth Langridge’s recent
review of all California groundwater adjudications.69 The potential advantages of adjudication include the following: creating binding property rights
and legal certainty; quantifying the amount of water to which each user is
entitled; establishing an evidence-based procedure that yields a shared information base; potentially resolving related, but separate issues; and management flexibility—it can result in continuing court jurisdiction over the
basin. The potential disadvantages are: it can be very time-consuming and
very expensive; it may not adequately account for interests of those who do
not hold water rights or appear in the adjudication; that legal standards may
remain unclear if the court renders a physical, rather than precisely legal,
decision; civil judges sometimes lack technical expertise; and, again, that
the court retains jurisdiction over the basin.70
Although we do not yet know how these enforcement alternatives will
play out under SGMA, a number of local-level groundwater management
arrangements have been in place in California for decades. Although GSPs
66. Legal groundwater property rights include correlative (overlying), appropriative, and prescriptive. Landowners overlying a groundwater aquifer have “overlying” rights to pump groundwater from the basin for use within the basin. These rights are correlative, meaning that all
overlying pumpers share the basin’s safe yield. Appropriative rights to groundwater are available
if there is surplus water after overlying users’ extractions. This water can be used outside the
basin. Appropriative rights, like surface water rights, are considered first in time, first in right.
Prescriptive groundwater rights occur when a user pumps more than the basin’s safe yield for
more than five consecutive years. Cities that have been withdrawing water in excess of safe yield
often have prescriptive water rights. The California Department of Water Resources has defined
safe yield as the amount of groundwater that can be continuously pumped from an aquifer without
adverse impact.
67. CAL. WATER CODE § 10737 (West 2015); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 830 et seq.
68. Blomquist, supra note 34.
69. See generally RUTH LANGRIDGE ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF CALIFORNIA’S ADJUDICATED
GROUNDWATER BASINS (2016).
70. See Russell M. McGlothlin & Jena Shoaf Acos, The Golden Rule* of Water Management, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 109 (2016), for an analysis of public and private interests,
and the role of courts and public agencies to manage the tension between achieving maximum
beneficial use and preserving common law water rights.
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and adjudications will be the primary means of enforcement under SGMA,
these pre-SGMA arrangements can provide us with important insights and
lessons. As described above, prior to SGMA, groundwater allocation disputes have been resolved in four ways: court adjudications, legislated special act districts, county ordinances using local police powers, and
voluntary (AB 3030) plans. Our research draws upon examples of each of
these mechanisms to explore: (i) the relationships between the legal standards, property rights, and groundwater allocation; (ii) the design, performance, and effectiveness of pre-SGMA arrangements; (iii) the role of
scientific information and analytic models to develop and maintain groundwater management arrangements; and (iv) how resilient arrangements have
been with respect to drought and other crises. The newly-forming GSAs
may find relevant lessons on the design of governance structures, selection
of specific management strategies (e.g., recharge programs, pumping restrictions, water storage agreements, and water transfers, exchanges, and
carryovers), and technical, financial, and human resources necessary to implement them.
Understanding the legal constraints, effectiveness and resilience of
past groundwater management arrangements is expected to provide insight
into the range of process mechanisms that might be beneficial under
SGMA. Figure 1 sketches a spectrum of options that contemplates a range
of third party neutral functions, from facilitative to evaluative.71 There are a
number of functions that mediators and facilitators might assist during GSA
formation on designing the governance structure, developing convenient
documents and communication strategy, and engaging interested parties and
stakeholders. Neutrals could assist further with GSP development, including data collection goals and protocols, joint fact-finding, consensus-based
decision-making, and effective engagement of interested parties.

71. This diagram was developed by Gina Bartlett of the Consensus Building Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, as part of discussions at the workshop hosted by Stanford University’s
Water in the West and Martin Daniel Gould Center for Conflict Resolution in November 2014.
TARA MORAN & AMANDA CRAVENS, CALIFORNIA’S SUSTAINABLE GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT
ACT OF 2014: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTING AND RESOLVING GROUNDWATER CONFLICTS
18 (2015). The continuum shows groundwater management planning processes available in California under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act. Starred processes are conceptual
processes discussed during the meeting that do not currently exist.
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FIGURE 1:
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act
Dispute Resolution Process Continuum
Changing Conditions—Physical (drought and climate) and Political

Voluntary
Plans w/
Community
Monitoring
(AB3030 Plans)

Facilitated
Input Process
(Stakeholders
Informed and
Provide Input)

Collaborative
Advisory
Group
(Stakeholders
Advise on
Groundwater
Planning)

Collaborative
Negotiation
with Impartial
Mediator
(Stakeholders
Directly Negotiate
Plans)

Durability of Act via Validation, Contract or
“Friendly” Adjudication

“Friendly”
Adjudication*

Phased
Streamlined
Adjudication* Adjudication*

(Parties Bring
Completed Plan to
Court and Request
Adjudication)

(Court Provides
Milestones and
Resources to
Support
Completion, e.g.
Technical Expert or
Mediator)

Traditional
Adjudication

(Yet to be Defined)

Note: Adjudicated Processes are not
Subject to Prop 218 Requirements

Technical Foundation & Data that Form the Groundwater Plan
* Note: These forms of adjudication are conceptual and do not exist formally.

V. CONCLUSION
SGMA provides a new framework for systematically addressing conflicts over groundwater in California and moving toward sustainable management. However, the success of the legislation ultimately depends on
active participation, guidance, and an ongoing commitment to the process
to ensure that the local groundwater agencies have the tools, resources, and
community support to manage groundwater resources effectively over the
long-term.
Developing the political will to make the substantive changes necessary to achieve sustainable groundwater management in some basins in the
state may be too challenging and will result in state enforcement or groundwater adjudication. However, many basins throughout the state have invested deeply in developing the relationships, trust, and information
necessary to achieve sustainable groundwater management in their basin.
This research aims to integrate the dispute system design elements
with collaborative governance of sustainable groundwater management.
Given the “wicked” nature of groundwater management combined with the
complexity of parties, scientific information, and policy consequences, the
process design is likely to have significant effects. Thus, our focus is on
examining the processes that will effectively engage diverse stakeholders to
optimize collective learning at the upstream stage of selecting a GSA to
govern its groundwater basin and, as a consequence, will contribute to more
effective and sustainable management under SGMA.

